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In most Western economies, the flourishing of the Welfare State has coincided with a decline 
of the role of the family: divorce has been introduced, and the number of marriages has 
decreased. We suggest that a taboo against divorce was part of the informal safety net in a 
period when social protection was provided by the family. Once the State started offering 
suitable alternatives, the taboo was no longer expedient, and was dropped. For the same 
reasons, marriage has become less popular. We further notice that divorce is an extremely 
costly process, and once allowed it may act as an independent reason for the reduction of the 
number of marriages. This latter result is especially evident under the assumption that agents 
subjectively evaluate the probability of facing a divorce using an availability heuristic. 
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Isabel Archer, the heroine of Henry James’ novel "The portrait of a lady",1 is a young American
heiress living in Europe. She refuses a marriage oﬀer by a fascinating English gentleman and
another by a brilliant American industrialist, and ends up marrying an American expatriate
in Italy. He is a superﬁcially charming person who turns out to be instead rather dull, and,
predictably, only interested in her money. Although she comes soon to realise the harshness of
her situation, and to suﬀer from it, she endures her plight and in fact manages, with a ﬂourish of
brinkmanship, to strike out a uneasy alliance with her otherwise estranged husband in defending
the appearance of a happy marriage. At the end of the story, we leave her in the middle of
an inner ﬁght, slowly building up the strength to go against her husband’s will. Divorce never
crosses her mind: in fact, at the very end of the book, she refuses an oﬀer to elope with her
former American suitor, still in love with her, and goes back to her husband.
In the novel, the action is set in the late XIX century. However, until not many years ago
most women would have fully subscribed to Isabel’s behaviour, and, given similar circumstances,
would have performed the same precarious balancing act. Today, we can understand Isabel only
if we put her in historical perspective. That the author portraits her as having the means to
decide for herself and all the same not ﬁnding the strength to do it, is actually a powerful
testimony of how strong was at the time (and later as well) the social stigma attached to
divorce.2
This paper takes up the question of why divorce has become socially acceptable and legally
permissible in recent years after centuries of stigmatisation;3 further, we investigate the impact
1Henry James (1843-1916), brother of the philosopher and psychologist William, is one of the greatest ﬁgures
in the English literature (he himself was American, but lived in England for almost his entire adult life). He is
credited with establishing the novel as a recognized literary genre, as opposed to a form of entertainment.
2In the 1996 ﬁlm taken from James’ book, directed by Jane Campion, the story ends before Isabel decides
whether to go back to his husband or not - in the 20th century, it was permissible to imagine an open ending.
3Divorce was not common, but not always explicitly forbidden in the ancient Western cultures; restrictions
against it began roughly with Constantine (who was Roman Emperor from 306 to 337 and famously initiated
the evolution of the empire into a Christian state) and became stronger over the centuries as the church took
jurisdiction over all the issues pertaining to marriage. The restrictions have lasted for centuries. For example,
in Italy, divorce was illegal until the 1970s; in the UK, it was legally possible since the 1930’s, although it was
clearly frowned upon, and a major liberalisation was realised in the early ’70s; in the US divorce has never been
really prohibited, but became a relevant phenomenon only starting from the ’70s, when unilateral divorce was
introduced.
2that the availability of divorce has had on marriage. This latter point is of some interest because
one might argue that the introduction of divorce is a potential deterrent to the reduction of the
number of marriages: to the extent that divorce oﬀers a way out of a mismatched marriage,
it should decrease the costs of marrying. However, the evidence does not support this line of
reasoning, as marriages have continued to fall in number despite the large popularity of divorce.
We oﬀer an argument in the opposite direction, casting divorce as a further reason for not
marrying.4
To accomplish the task we are pursuing, we develop a two-fold argument:
• First, we suggest at a general level that the deep transformation of the Western societies
in the last forty years has favoured both the introduction of divorce and the reduction
of marriages; while in the past the family was the sole provider of many services (basic
education and health-care, insurance, old-age support, etc.) today both the State and the
market oﬀer important alternatives (public and private education and health-care, public
and private insurance and pensions, etc.). As a consequence, the role of the family has
declined, and less people choose to marry; at the same time, the taboo against divorce
has been dropped, as there is no need to protect the family at all costs.5
• Second, we notice at a more speciﬁc level that the costly nature of the divorce process may
act as an additional and independent deterrent t om a r r i a g e ;o n c ep e o p l ea n t i c i p a t et h a t
their marriage may end up in a divorce, they may be less prone to marry, and choose a
looser form of union (say, cohabitation), if they estimate a very large probability of divorce
and are aware of its high costs. A key factor here is how agents form their expectations on
how their marriage will turn out; we compare a version of the model with agents capable
of rational expectations with a version in which they use the availability heuristics as
deﬁned by Tversky and Kahneman (1982b),6 and argue that the predictions of this latter
version are consistent with the main stylized facts.
4This point is made also by Konrad and Lommerud (2008). Their focus is on the role of redistributive taxation
as an incentive to marry — in this case acting as a way of reducing divorce costs.
5For a recent detailed investigation of the interplay between the State and the family as alternative providers
of insurance, and its eﬀect on family formation and dissolution, see Anderberg (2007).
6Brieﬂy, people are said to rely on availability heuristics when they "assess ... the probability of an event
by the ease with which instances or occurences can be brought to mind" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982b, p.
11). Unfortunately, the availability of the facts stored in our memory is not necessarily related to the frequency
with which they actually happened; we remember more easily facts that have somehow solicited an emotional
3In Section II, we will illustrate in more details the above arguments and establish some links
with the existing literature, before moving to a formal analysis in Sections III and IV, and then
to a few concluding remarks in Section V.
II Background
The economic literature on divorce has been heavily inﬂuenced by Becker’s pioneering work
on family economics. According to Becker (1991) the main determinants of divorce are to be
found in the couple’s earnings diﬀerentials; for example, high-earning women gain relatively
little from a marriage, since the small diﬀerential implies that there is less scope for an eﬃcient
sexual division of labour, and have a stronger fall-back position in case of divorce. On the whole,
then, a beckerian perspective suggest that high-income, well-educated women are more prone
to divorce. We take here a complementary perspective, as we look at why divorce has become
permissible at a certain point in history, rather than focusing on the nature of divorce once it
has been established. To put it diﬀerently, the beckerian focus is on the motivations and the
costs of divorce in our contemporary society; we look mostly at how changes in the structure of
society have made divorce possible. Our emphasis lies in particular on how the societal changes
over the past few decades impact on the relative power of men and women within a marriage
(see Beck and Beck-Gersheim, 1995), focusing more on the diﬀerence, or lack thereof, in the
source o fe a r n i n gt h a ni nt h elevel — although clearly variations in sources will normally reﬂect
themselves into variations in level.
To illustrate our arguments, to be developed formally in the next two Sections, we brieﬂy
sketch the recent evolution of the family as society has moved from its agricultural past through
a transitional phase of early industralisation to its contemporary post-industrial structure. Of
course, we simplify the story as much as we can, taking somewhat extreme views in order to
save space and time.
A quick look at the evolution of the family
In a pre-industrial society, the market has a very limited role. Both men and women are engaged
in self-production, and the division of labor across genders does not necessarily reﬂect the inside
response or are especially out of the ordinary. Hence, availability heuristics imply a tendency to overestimate
certain probabilities. We return at length on this point in Section IV below.
4home/outside home cleavage. The family is in fact very much a business organisation running
e.g. a farm. It is important to notice that men and women, although they fulﬁll diﬀerent tasks,
contribute to the prosperity of the family in a symmetric fashion, in the sense that they all
work within the family itself. Their claim on the commodities entering the family consumption
basket comes from the same source. It is diﬃcult here to speak of disparity in earning levels,
as there is no objective metric through which the value of production can be assessed.
This sort of structure has historically changed with the advent of the industrialised society, in
which the man starts working for the market while the woman attends to the household chores,
and the consumption goods are acquired through the market (as opposed to self-production).
In this case, we do have an evident earning disparity, due to the fact that market production
is rewarded in money units, whereas home production is not. We want to focus however on a
particular aspect of this disparity. While it is obvious that the sexual division of labour reﬂects
in principle an eﬃcient task allocation routine, it is also obvious that it implies an asymmetry
in the power relationship, should any dispute arise between the partners. As the consumption
basket is no longer self-produced, but only accessible via the market, and given that only the
man has a direct claim on money income (the instrument needed to access the commodity
market), the fall-back position of the two partners in case of disagreement is extremely unequal,
despite the fact that the home production of the women is just as important as the market
production of the man as far as the well-being of the family is concerned.
Finally, in what we may call the post-industrial society, both men and women work for the
market, and share the household work or hire on the market a person to do it. There is less
scope for a sexual division of labour, as comparative advantages tend to be modest inasmuch
as marketable skills are more homogenous across genders. The diﬀerence in terms of the level
of money income that the two genders may obtain is reduced (although not eliminated), and,
most importantly from our point of view, the symmetry is re-established in terms of the source
of purchasing power. This generates a diﬀerent scenario than in the industrial society. In the
latter, the shadow value of home-production might have been greater than the value of the
market production, still the woman would have had less power in any dispute. In the post-
industrial society, for both genders power comes from market earnings, whose levels can be
compared to determine the relative fall-back positions, as is usually emphasized in beckerian
analyses of divorce.
5The family and the State as alternative providers of social protection
So far, we spelled the implication of the family working arrangements (who works at home and
who works outside) for the pattern of entitlements to the goods that enter the consumption
bundle. The consumption basket of a family includes however also services, not only goods.
Some of these services, like love or companionship, are intangible and can only be found within
a family. Material services, like child care, mutual insurance, old-age security, have also been
for centuries provided within the family, but in the last ﬁve or six decades the Welfare State
has become a relevant player in this sector. The working arrangement has implications also for
the access to certain services when they are provided by the Welfare State.
To see this, notice ﬁrst that the services we mentioned constitute a safety net, a form of social
protection, for the society as a whole; they are mostly insurance services, for which markets
are known to be typically incomplete. In the pre-industrial society these services were provided
within the family like everything else. With the passage to industrialisation, some of these
services can be provided by the State; a relevant example is the pension system, that entitles
anybody who works in the market to a pension once retired. Note that the asymmetry which
we saw as characterising the industrial family is still present here. The State crowds out the
family as the provider of old-age security, but the claim to this service is reserved to those who
work outside the family, that is men. Women can access the survivors pension scheme, but
only if married to the men originally entitled to the pension. Men have easier access to outside
services than women — which again reinforces a tendency to diﬀerentiate across genders the
fall-back positions in case of a dispute. Finally, in the post-industrialised family, both genders
have independent access to the services, and symmetry is again restored.
We claim that the availability of social protection services from the Welfare State has made
divorce possible, ﬁrst by making it socially acceptable, and then legally permissible. In line
with the mainstream economic literature on divorce referred to above, we intend the legal norm
as following and reﬂecting the social customs: a law introducing or facilitating divorce will be
passed only when the social attitude of the voters is favourable to such a law. In turn, since
a social norm has the primary task of enhancing the prosperity of a community,7 it will be
established only if a suﬃciently large number of members perceive an advantage in following it,
in this case if enough people are in favour of divorce.
7See e.g. Akerlof (1982) and Coleman (1990).
6So, the key question is indeed, when are people in favour of divorce?8 In the next Section,
we will argue that, as we move from the traditional through the industrial to the post-industrial
family, the attitude towards divorce changes, becoming progressively more favourable. From
being a threat to the social protection network, which was constituted exclusively by the families
in a traditional society, divorce becomes for the industrial and especially post-industrial fami-
lies, an option that, potentially, makes people better-oﬀ by allowing an avenue of escape from
mismatched marriages. So, people modify their preferred option (become supporters, rather
than opponents, of divorce) as the circumstances change over the years.
Before moving to the analysis in Section III, we would like to make a few remarks on yet
another point (to be discussed formally in Section IV). We said that divorce constitutes a
"potentially" useful option. Of course, it is also a costly option. In recent years, the costs of
divorce have decreased substantially; legal fees are less than they used to be, the time required
for ﬁnalising the process is shorter, the social stigma has been removed at least partially, etc.
This relative reduction should however not blind us to the fact that divorce remains, in absolute
terms, extremely costly on the psychological side; it generates a painful condition from which
one may in fact be never free (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). When a person divorces, the
connection with one’s former partner will take a long time to be really severed, if ever. To see
this, it is suﬃcient to consider that the main source of divorce costs is the fact that during the
years of marriage the couple has established rights over a number of household public goods,
and as long as these goods still exist after the divorce, new rules have to be found for letting
the former spouses continue to exercise their rights, or for compensating one of them if he or
she forfeits them. So, divorcees have to agree on what to do with joint properties, such as
houses or cars, and in case of children, they have to agree on how to share custody, parental
responsibilities, etc. The conﬂict that may, and normally will, arise between the spouses at the
time of divorce is extremely painful. The "agreements" have often to be imposed by a judge.
Divorce law provides several pre-ordained solutions to the conﬂict (varying from country to
country, although there are common features such as assigning the children to the mother,9
etc.), and this may help insofar as it reduces the duration of the conﬂict. However, it is clear
8There are of course many types of divorce. In the formal model, we will focus for simplicity on unilateral,
no-fault divorce.
9That would be true of Western countries; in Muslim countries, the children are normally assigned to the
father.
7for example that divorced parents will always retain some sort of link with the each other (they
will remain the parents of their children, no matter what); fresh opportunities to rekindle the
conﬂict, and the attendant costs, may arise for a long time. A divorced person does not revert
to single status: he or she is forever an ex-spouse.
Given this, it is possible to argue that the very possibility of divorce may in fact make
marriage a less, rather than a more, popular option. If a person estimates a suﬃciently high
probability that his or her marriage ends up in a divorce, the costs to be faced in that case are
so high that it makes sense to choose an alternative living-in option (say cohabitation). And
we saw, (fn. 6) that the availability heuristics induces people to overestimate events whose
occurrence is particularly easy to remember — among them, one might argue, divorces.10
III The emergence of divorce under changing family structures
To begin with, we consider a very simple ﬁnite-horizon two-period economy.11 In the ﬁrst
period, agents decide whether to marry or stay single; in the second whether to stay married
or divorce. Decisions are taken on the basis of lifetime utility. In general, the per-period utility
function includes three items: a consumption (net income) ﬂow (y), a material services ﬂow
(x), and an immaterial services ﬂow (Z). We do not specify a period index, since ﬂows do
not depend on periods, and we ignore discounting. The population comprises N men and N
women; then, there will be at most N couples. All agents have the same utility function;
all men earn the same, and so do all women, but we allow for gender-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in
earnings/consumption levels, as well as in the ﬂows of both kinds of services. We do not
explicitly model search and matching; we simply assume that, in the ﬁrst period, each agent
has a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to meet another agent of the opposite gender: if they are
willing to marry each other, the marriage will take place, otherwise they will stay single (we
live it unspeciﬁed whether they choose cohabitation, or an ever looser form of relationship, or
stay separated).
An important element for the analysis is the extent to which agents have compatible person-
alities and enjoy each other’s company or not. In our simpliﬁed setting, the only chance they
10In fact, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982a, p. 164) ﬁrst example of availability heuristics is as follows: "...one
may assess the divorce rate in a given community by recalling divorces among one’s acquaintances".
11Later, we will strenghten the dynamic nature of the model in order to investigate the evolution of marriage
behaviour across generations.
8have to get to know each other is during the ﬁrst period; if a man marries a compatible-type
woman the ﬂow of immaterial services Z takes a positive value, Z = ζ>0, otherwise, it takes
a negative value Z = −ζ<0. In this latter case, if divorce is available, they might want to
contemplate its feasibility in the second period.12 The probability, for each agent, to end up
in a good or in a bad match will be key for the subsequent analysis. A realistic, and at the
same time simple, way of modelling this probability is to assume that it is idiosyncratic to the
couple. There are so many possible personality variants, so many diverse circumstances under
which people meet and marry, so many diﬀerent senses in which two people may be compatible
with each other, that it seems reasonable to assume that each couple has a diﬀerent chance of
forming a successful union. Hence, letting νij denote the probability of a successful marriage
for a generic couple formed by agents i and j, the expected value of the immaterial service ﬂow












The true probability is, plausibly, not known to the agents. So, they have to guess it, and
compute the expected value of the immaterial services ﬂow on this basis. For now, we do not
specify the mechanics of the guess; we only notice that each agent will make the guess in his
or her own way, using diﬀerent procedures for collecting information and elaborating it, etc.
At one extreme, there might be agents endowed with perfect foresight, who predict the true
value of the probability of successful marriage with pinpoint accuracy; moving toward the other
extreme, there might be agents who err in the direction of underestimating this probability —
to an extent that depends on how much they are relying on availability heuristics. In the next
Section, we will study the formation of this estimated probability in a more detailed way; for
now, we proceed by taking it as given. Hence, denoting the subjective probability by pij,w e






We now have all the elements to write the per-period utility function; if we take x and z to
measure the income equivalents of the service ﬂows, and assume risk-neutrality, we write
ui = yi + xi + zi. (3)
12In a more complete model, we would have added a period in which the agents search for their preferred
partner, thereby limiting the risk of a subsequent divorce. However, this would not have altered the qualitative
results in any way. A study which explicitly focuses on search processes and divorce is Cameron (2003); for more
references to the search models of courtship and marriage, see e.g. Balestrino and Ciardi (2008).
9Depending on the type of the family, the access to the ﬂo w sv a r i e si nd i ﬀerent ways when the
agents change marital status. We will consider the three types in turn.
We focus now on the process whereby the agents, in order to decide whether to marry or not,
compare their lifetime expected utilities from staying single and from marrying, and choose the
higher one. In order to study the endogenous formation of divorce law, we proceed as follows:
• we investigate the agents’ choices when divorce is not allowed;
• we ask whether their well-being would be improved by the introduction of divorce; agents
for whom the answer is "yes" would vote in favour of a law allowing divorce; agents for
whom the answer is"no" would vote against;
• we suppose that a divorce law is proposed, and check whether a majority for or against it
can be formed:
• if divorce law is not approved, we end the analysis;
• if divorce law is approved, we ask whether the presence of divorce alters the incentives to
marry.
The pre-industrial family.
A single agent obtains, in each period, the consumption ﬂow y; typically, it will be self-produced.
The agent enjoys neither material nor immaterial services if non-married; he or she does not
beneﬁt of, say, the mutual insurance available for the members of a family (an example of
material service) or of the companionship that a spouse can oﬀer (an example of immaterial
services). So, in each period the utility function of a single agent (male or female) in a pre-
industrial society can be written
ui = yi, (4)
where the upper bar denotes the single status. A married agent has for simplicity the same
consumption, but has also access to both kinds of services
ui = yi + xi + zi. (5)
Take then a man and a woman who meet. Will they marry? In the absence of divorce, either
of them would marry if
2
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10The term on the left-hand side (lhs) is lifetime utility from marriage, and that on the right-hand
side (rhs) is lifetime utility from staying single: an agent who gets at least the same utility from
marrying than from staying single, marries. The perceived probability of a good match, that is
the probability of enjoying the companionship and love of one’s spouse, will give us a criterion
to compare the decisions across societal types.
We proceed then to identify the probability level above which an agent in the pre-industrial
society marries, denoted b pij. As long as ζ<x , it is easy to see that b pij =0 , ∀i,j.13 The point is
that if ζ is small relative to x it is obviously better to marry no matter what; even with pij =0
it would be worth marrying, for then (6) becomes:
xi − ζi ≥ 0. (7)
We can thus state
Claim 1 In a pre-industrial society in which divorce is not allowed, if ζi ≤ xi,t h e nb pij =0 ,
∀i,j — that is, all agents marry.
Would divorce be possible in this context? To answer this question, we suppose that a
divorce law is proposed in the ﬁrst period; agents are therefore given an ex-ante choice, i.e.
they are asked whether they would like to be able to divorce, should the necessity arise in the
future. Assume then that the agents know that, if z turns out to be negative, he and his spouse








xi − ζi − γ
¢
. (8)
Clearly, the expected utility of a person married for both periods exceed that of one who divorces
in period 2; the diﬀerence between the expected utilities without and with divorce is
xi − ζi + γ>0. (9)
As we argued in the previous Section, γ is bound to be relative large; however, even if γ =0 ,
(9) would be positive as a consequence of (7). The point is that by divorcing the person loses
the material services ﬂow, which is the reason why he or she married in the ﬁrst place: divorce
is not really an opportunity.
13The assumption that ζ<xmakes good sense in a pre-industrial world. Agents will subjectively assign much
more value to the ﬂow of material services, that are key to their subsistence, rather than to the ﬂow of immaterial
services.
11This analysis is thus consistent with the observation that in traditional communities marriage
is widespread and divorce is stigmatised. Marriage has an all-important function to serve; it is
the only access to the provider of speciﬁc and relevant services that constitute the very safety
net of the whole society. The social attitude is one of great respect for marriage, which is
strongly protected by the social norms. The stigmatisation of divorce is one such custom. In
this social climate, a law permitting divorce will never be accepted. Suppose in fact that such
a law is proposed in the ﬁrst period, and that it requires a simple majority to pass (as there
are 2N agents in the society, this requires that at least N +1vote in favour). In the present
setting, all voters would cast their ballott against it: that is, if the agents are given an ex-ante
choice of whether to allow a divorce law or not, they would all vote it down. We have thus:
Claim 2 In a pre-industrial society, divorce law can never be established.
The industrial family
This family type is chacterised by an asymmetry between genders. Letting the superscripts m
and f denote a generic man and a generic woman, respectively, we take it that a single man
gets utility um = ym+xm per period, whereas a single woman has instead utility uf = yf +xf,
again per period; presumably, ym >y f and xm > xf. Since the woman loses her income when
she marries, the husband will have to transfer some of his own net income ﬂow; we also take
it that the material services ﬂow for married couples is the same across genders, and is larger
than the ﬂow accessible to single men:
xm = xf = x>xm (10)
Thus, a married man gets, in each period, utility





where sfm is the (possibly couple-speciﬁc) side-transfer; a married woman gets instead














ζ ≥ yf +xf for women. In general, men will want to
make the transfer as small as possible. Deﬁne implicitly b sfmas the transfer that makes a woman










− (2pfm− 1)ζ, (13)
which is indeed couple-speciﬁc as depends on the probability pfm. The transfer (which we
expect to be positive) should be equal to the original goods ﬂow minus the excess material
services ﬂow (xf − x<0) minus the expected value of the immaterial services ﬂow.
We take it that the transfer equals b sfm. Then, all women would accept a marriage proposal;
the question is, when would men do that proposal? In principle, we would want to identify the
level of pmf above which a man wants to marry, called e pmf. In order to compare the present
situation we the one depicted in the previous subsection, we ask however a slightly diﬀerent
question, that is we look for the conditions under which e pmf =0 .W h e npmf =0 , the gain from
marriage exceeds the loss if x − xm ≥ ζ + b sfm; substituting for b sfm we get:





Hence, we can state
Claim 3 In an industrial society without divorce law, if 2x ≥
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then e pmf =0 , ∀m,f — that is, all agents marry.
Notice that the condition under which everybody marries is more stringent than in the pre-
industrial society: marriage is less desirable, because a certain amount of services is available
also for singles, and because the asymmetric access to the labour market makes marriage heavier
for the men. In fact, for condition (14) to be satisﬁed, it is important that yf, xf, xm are small
relative to x, and that either ζ is small or pf is large (or both). In other words, marriage
will (predictably) be more popular when women earn little, when the material services ﬂow
for singles is modest relative to that for married people, when agents attach little importance
to the emotional aspects of marital life, and when women estimate a large probability of a
successful marriage. In fact, these aspects are broadly consistent with the stylised description
of an industrial society.










−b sfm− ζ − γ
´
. (15)
13As for a woman, we have to deal with the question of how she can earn an income once divorced.
The optimistic view would be that a divorced woman can re-enter the labour market and ﬁnd a
job with gives her the same income as if she were single. In many cases, this is far too optimistic,
as industrial societies are in general not characterised by a large presences of middle-aged women
in their workforce; divorced women might also have dependent children, their skills might have
become obsolete, etc. We make here the extreme assumption that a divorced woman can only
obtain a ﬂow of material services (for simplicity this is indeed taken to be the same she would
have if she were single), but no earned income (which the same as saying that we normalize this
speciﬁc income to zero). Therefore her lifetime utility under divorce would be
pfm2
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In order to compute the diﬀerences in lifetime utilities for men and women with and without
divorce, we compare (11) with (15) and (12) with (16).14 Men will be better-oﬀ with divorce if
b sfm+ ζ>γ . (17)
As long as the transfer to the wife and the subjective perception of the emotional value of a
good match are small relative to γ (which, it will be recalled, is large in absolute terms), this
condition is not satisﬁed. As for women, they will be better-oﬀ with divorce if the utility gained
in the second period of a mismatched marriage falls short of that gained from divorcing, that
is if b sfm+ x − ζ ≤ xf − γ. Substituting for b sfmusing (13) and simplifying, we obtain a clearer
version of the same condition, namely:
2ζpfm >γ+ yf. (18)
If the subjective probability estimation of a good match as well as the subjective perception of
the value of the intangible services are small relative to the cost of divorce (which includes now
also the loss of income), the condition is not satisﬁed.
Interestingly, the divorce conditions diﬀer for men and women; and, clearly, the cost of
divorce for women is much larger that for men, so they are more adverse to it than men are.
This reﬂects the power asymmetry which we referred to earlier, an asymmetry which turns out
to have the perverse eﬀect of making those who stand to gain the least from marriage, i.e.
women, the strongest enemies of divorce.
14Notice that (11) and (12) are per-period utilities, so they have to be multiplied by two to give lifetime utility.
14Suppose ﬁnally that, as in the previous case, a divorce law is proposed in the ﬁrst period,
and that a simple majority is required to make it pass. Faced with this ex-ante choice, agents
will all vote against the law if conditions (17) and (18) both fail for all men and all women. In
fact, for divorce law to be rejected, it is enough that either all men or all women oppose divorce,
for then a majority of N +1can never be achieved:
Claim 4 In an industrial society, if either 2ζpfm <γ+ yf for all f,m or e sfm+ ζ<γfor all
f,m, divorce will not be allowed.
Notice that, while in the pre-industrial case divorce law was clearly doomed from the start, it
is not impossible to conceive of a situation in which an industrial society might allow it. There
clearly are combinations of parameters that permit the formation of a majority in favour of
divorce; for example, a large value of pfm for some couples, combined with a small value of yf,
might made a fraction of women favourable to divorce; at the same time, there might be enough
men for which condition (17) holds. The question of how likely this and similar combinations
are to hold in practice is however moot. Hystorically, the case of Italy might provide a good
discussion. In the 70’s, when divorce was made legal, Italy still had some characteristics of
an industrial society, most notably the power asymmetry within the family resulting from the
employment of the husband in the labour market and of the wife at home; however, it evolved
quickly into a post-industrial structure, although with a more limited labour force participation
of women than in most OECD countries.
The post-industrial family




















for both genders. To determine the value of the critical probability level ˇ pi,w es o l v e




ζ = yi + xi, (20)
to arrive at
ˇ pij =1 /2, ∀i,j. (21)
15This follows because in that case the expected value of z will be zero, and thus the equality
(20) will hold. Marriage in a post-industrial society is much less popular than in the other two
cases. We state:
Claim 5 In a post-industrial society in which divorce is not allowed, only agents for whom
pi ≥ 1/2 are willing to marry; actual marriages will take place when two agents, both willing to
marry, meet.
The only diﬀerence between being married or not is the quality of the relationship with the
partner; if one expects it to be good, he or she will marry, otherwise stays single.







ζ + pijζ −
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1 − pij¢
γ. The expected utility with divorce allowed is thus larger than
without if
ζ>γ . (22)
Hence, supposing again that a divorce law is proposed in the ﬁrst period, it will achieve the
required majority (indeed a unanimous support) if the beneﬁt from the immaterial services is
larger than the cost of divorce, that is when the subjective valuation of the intangible assets of
a marriage (love, companionship, etc.) is suﬃciently large. The outcome of the ex-ante choice
is now in favour of divorce law if (22) is satisﬁed:
Claim 6 In a post-industrial society divorce will be allowed if ζ>γ .
The importance attached to the emotional, immaterial value of a marriage in our contem-
porary, post-industrial society, makes it plausible that the condition in the above Claim is
satisﬁed.15
We move now to the question whether the presence of divorce alters the incentives to marry.
Once divorce is allowed, a person marries if
pij2
¡















15In an interesting study, LeVine et al. (1995) report that only 3.5% of the respondents to their survey in the
US, and 3.7% in the UK, would have been willing to marry a person who had all the ideal quality of a partner
without being in love. Corresponding ﬁg u r e si nI n d i aa n dP a k i s t a nw e r e4 9 %a n d5 0 , 4 % .T h i si si nl i n ew i t ho u r
claim that the role of the family as provider of social protection has declined where the Welfare State has been
developed.






Claim 7 In a post-industrial society in which divorce is allowed, only agents for whom pi ≥
(ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ) are willing to marry; actual marriages will take place when two agents, both
willing to marry, meet.
The possibility of divorce changes the behaviour of the agents in that it makes marriage
less likely — the more so, the larger is γ. In fact, if γ is approximately zero, then the critical
probability level is approximately 1/2, i.e. the same as without divorce law. If divorce is
extremely accessible, then marriage behaviour does not change. We have actually argued that
this is not the case — γ is likely to be large; so, in order for agents to be willing to marry
under divorce law, the perceived probability of a good marriage must be strictly larger than
1/2 (whereas in the absence of divorce law 1/2 was enough). If we order all agents from the
one with the lowest to the one with the highest subjective probability pi,t h e nw ec a nv i e wt h e
threshold value ˇ p as partitioning the society into two groups, one comprising all those who are
willing to marry (pi > ˇ p) and the other all those who stay single; the introduction of divorce
law reduces the number of those belonging to the former group.
This conclusion invites a deeper investigation of how the presence of divorce changes mar-
riage behaviour. We take up this issue in the next Section, using a modiﬁed version of the
model employed so far.
IV Divorce and marriage in a post-industrial society
In the previous section, we have focused on the behaviour of each generation taken alone. Now,
let us consider what happens as generations succeed each other, in particular what happens
to the marriage rate when divorce is introduced in a post-industrial society. To this end,
we modify our setup transforming the ﬁnite-horizon economy into an overlapping generations
(OLG) economy. The analysis above carries over to the new setting as a description of the
behaviour of each generation taken in isolation; however, we are now also interested in the link
between generations. Normally, in OLG models such a link is provided by intergenerational
transfers; here, the only element that connects the various generations is the information that
17members of the present generations can collect on the behaviour of the past ones. The behaviour
we are interested in is of course the one concerning divorce, and the information comes from
the actual rate of divorce of past generations.
Alternative assumptions on the formation of expectations
In the previous Section we did not specify how the agents formed their guesses on the probability
that their marriage is a good one. Now, we look more closely at this issue. We will compare
the case of agents who are able to perfectly forecast this probability (perfect foresight) with the
one in which they use availability heuristics. Of course, the perfect foresight framework needs
no presentation. A few words should instead be spent to explain the recourse to an availability
heuristic in the present context. In fact, we wish to argue that, with speciﬁc reference to the
marriage market, this latter assumption is at least as plausible, possibly more plausible, than
that of full rationality.
The idea is that divorce is a good instance of a fact that generates an emotional response
and thus tends to ﬁgure prominently in our memory. When we hear that someone we know is
getting a divorce, we feel sorry for her; a kid who sees his parents divorcing will probably suﬀer
long-term negative consequences; celebrity divorces, and the tabloids feasting on them, hit our
imagination. On the other hand, lots of marriages are happy; but, since a happy marriage is not
breaking news, this goes largely unnoticed. As a consequence, agents would tend to overestimate
the actual occurrence of divorces, and, relatedly, also to overestimate the probability that they
themselves will divorce. There are several empirical conﬁrmations of the fact that people do use
availability heuristics in real life. Casual observation suggests it: for example, it is deﬁnitely
more likely to die in car accidents than in plane crashes, but since the latter are much more
spectacular and as such heavily emphasized by the media, they are more easily called to mind:
as a consequence, many of us are afraid of boarding a plane, but not of driving a car. Heuristics
allow us to cut on decision-making costs (which is why are often employed), but they may, and
often will, induce judgment errors: several experiments illustrating the mistakes descending
from the availability heuristic and other judgment biases are discussed in the literature.16
Still, it would be too much to contend that availability heuristics have a general plausibility
as a decision rule. It has been convincingly argued that heuristics and biases can be overcome
16For in-depth accounts of the pervasiveness of cognitive fallacies, see e.g. Kahneman et al. (1982) and Gilovich
et al. (2002).
18by frequent players in private markets (List 2004), due to a repeated interaction eﬀect — people
can be expected to learn quickly how to behave eﬃciently. But the occasional nature of the act
of marrying implies that the players in the marriage market do not repeat the "transaction"
often enough to become "frequent players". This is why family formation and dissolution seems
to be a fruitful area for exploring the implication of availability heuristics. True, it has also
been argued that the family, like the market, is a place in which economic decisions are taken
repeatedly through interactions between two (or more) agents, and therefore it is just as possible
to assume that such agents learn over time to make eﬃcient choices. However, this argument,
which is at the heart of the so-called collective models of the family (Chiappori, 1988; Browning
and Chiappori, 1998; Apps and Rees, 1999), refers to the management of an existing family, not
to the formation of a new one. To be sure, its validity, within its ﬁeld of application, has been
challenged from many sides: for example Lundberg and Pollak (2001) have noticed how the
repeated interaction argument fails to cover important and diﬃcult decisions with long-term,
largely unforeseeable, consequences and a high degree of irreversibility — say when one of the
partners is considering whether to move to another city or to switch to another job.17 By the
same logic, it seems even less plausible to apply the argument to family formation: there are
indeed signiﬁcant costs to be faced in case one would wish to reverse the decision to marry, and
more generally there clearly is limited scope for repeated interaction.
Then, a perfectly rational agent i, when he or she meets a prospective partner j at i m et,
predicts accurately the probability ν
ij




t . At the opposite extreme, there is an agent who relies entirely on availability
heuristics. In our setting, he will use a perception of the divorce rate of the previous generation
to assess the probability of his or her own marriage ending in a divorce. Such perception will
err in the sense of overestimating the actual occurrence of divorces. Assuming that at time t−1


















17To model these issues, Lundberg and Pollak (2001) advocate a non-stationary, multi-stage game in which the
absence of a commitment mechanism makes ineﬃcient outcomes possible. Simpler alternatives to the collective
approach call for non-cooperative models assuming Cournot behaviour — see e.g. Konrad and Lommerud (1995)
and Anderberg and Balestrino (2007).







t−1 > 0. Then, a totally biased agent i, when he or she
meets a prospective partner j at i m et, predicts inaccurately the probability the the eventual
marriage is a "good" match by setting pi
t =1− δt.
In fact, it might be more realistic to assume that most agents lie between these two extremes,







(1 − δt), (27)
where ki ∈ [0,1]. As k approaches unity, the agent qualiﬁes as prevalently rational; as k ap-
proaches zero, the agent qualiﬁes as prevalently biased. The parameter k is in principle agent-
speciﬁc ,a n da ss u c hi n d e x e db yt h es u p e r s c r i p ti;i tm a yb et a k e nt or e ﬂect the degree of what
is called "self-eﬃcacy" (Bandura, 1997) or "perceived behavioural control" (Ajzen, 2005), that
is the subjectively held probability than one is capable of executing a certain course of action (in
this case, stay married). The higher the degree of self-eﬃcacy or perceived behavioural control,
the more accurate is the perception of what one can actually do or not, and therefore the more
precise is the estimate of one’s chances.
How the possibility of divorce aﬀects the incentives to marry
Suppose that in our post-industrial society, divorce has just been introduced at time θ.T h e
actual rate of divorce was zero at θ − 1, and according to our formulation of the availability
heuristic, the perceived rate at period θ will be zero too — see (26). This seems plausible: no
divorce has ever occurred and therefore the biased agents overestimate the frequency of the
only type of marriage they can remember — that is, stable marriages. Since however divorces
do occur at time θ, the perceived risk of divorce for agents who form their expectations exactly
at θ will be positive and larger than the actual rate of divorce.
Let us now investigate what happens in each of the periods θ−1,θand θ+118 for agents facing
diﬀerent divorce risks, considering the polar cases of perfect foresight (ki =1 )a n dp e r f e c tb i a s
(ki =0 ) — the intermediate cases can be understood as a mix of these two extreme situations.
Agents are classiﬁed as having high, medium and low risk of divorce; the exact deﬁnition and
the outcomes are presented compactly in Table 1.
Consider rational agents ﬁrst. The behaviour changes as the risk of divorce decreases — as
we move down from one line to the next (recall that ν is the true probability of having a good




medium risk (1/2 <ν<(ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ))
low risk (ν>(ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ))
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Table 1: Willingness to marry by category of divorce risk
marriage). The ﬁrst category includes agents who are very prone to divorce: being rational,
they clearly aren’t willing to marry in any of the three periods under consideration because of
(21). The second category includes agents for whom the risk of divorce takes an intermediate
value: they are willing to marry at θ−1, but unwilling once divorce is introduced — see (21) and
(24). Finally, the third category includes agents with low risk of divorce: under rationality, they
are always willing to marry — the couples formed at θ will divorce at θ +1with a probability
1 − ν
ij
t < 1/2, but this will not alter the incentives to marry at θ +1 .
Under bias, several combinations are possible. We focus here on one which has, in our view,




t > (ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ) at t = θ − 1,θ; (28a)
p
ij
t < (ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ) at t = θ +1 . (28b)
This combination may be interpreted as follows. We know that when divorce is not allowed, the
availability heuristic induces the agent to overestimate the incidence of stable marriages; this
is (28)a. Then, at θ − 1 and θ they all should be willing to marry, irrespective of their actual
divorce risk, as we report in Table 1. As a consequence, there will be many marriages, and
among them a sizeable share will be unstable, as also all agents with medium-to-high divorce
risk have married. Therefore, there will be a large actual rate of divorce at θ; this in turn, will
generate a low perceived rate of successful marriages at θ+1— which is (28)b. Then, the biased
agents will not marry at θ +1 , again irrespective of their divorce rate (see the last column of
Table 1). Incidentally, notice that at θ +1biased agents with high and medium divorce risk
follow the same course of action that they would take as rational agents, whereas those with
low divorce risk follow the opposite path.
We see a clear pattern emerging from Table 1. In a rational world of changes are more
nuanced: the agents use all the available information and take a course of action that reﬂects
21their actual divorce risk (they become more willing to marry as the risk declines). Biased agents
act on the basis of a misinterpretation of the evidence they have access to, and do not rely on
their actual divorce risk. The introduction of divorce thus generates a sharp change of behaviour
for the biased agents — all jump from being willing to being unwilling to marry. Instead, in the
case of rational agents only those with intermediate risk change their attitude. Recall however
that this is an extreme characterisation producing extreme outcomes; if all agents were fully
biased, nobody would marry from θ+1onward. Of course, there must be partially biased agents




t ≥ (ζ + γ)/(2ζ + γ) at t = θ +1 , (29)
that is, those whose estimated rate of successful marriages is still large enough to be above the
threshold identiﬁed in Claim 7.
Comparing the outcomes of Table 1, and accounting for the likely behaviour of intermediate
types (neither fully rational nor fully biased), it is possible to argue that, depending on whether
there is a prevalence of rational or biased agents, we expect diﬀering impacts of divorce on mar-
riage decisions. Under rationality, only the medium-risk agents change their attitude towards
marriage when divorce is introduced at θ; so, the model predicts a moderate reduction in the
number of marriages. Instead under bias all agents change their attitude, so the the prediction
is that the presence of divorce reduces the number of marriages sharply. Indeed, we know that
virtually all developed countries have experienced a continuing and signiﬁcant reduction in the
number of marriages in the last decades, and that the fall in the marriage rates begins roughly
at the same time as the spread of divorce (see below for a few examples).
A further look at Table 1 indicates also that, as we move towards a prevalence of biased
agents, we expect a larger rate of divorce at θ, but not necessarily from θ+1onwards. Indeed, at
θ biased agents are all willing to marry no matter how risky is their marriage, whereas rational
agents only marry if their divorce risk is low; instead, from θ +1onwards the only diﬀerence in
behaviour between rational and biased agents concerns the low-risk type, which should aﬀect
t h eo v e r a l ld i v o r c er a t em i n i m a l l ya n y w a y .S o ,i nt h er a t i o n a l i t yc a s e ,t h ed i v o r c er a t es h o u l d
be stable over time, whereas in the availability heuristics case should ﬁr s tr i s ea n dt h e ns l o w
down.
The stylised facts do not appear to contradict the availabily heuristic assumption. It is often
the case in the Western countries that the divorce rate has jumped up after the introduction of
22divorce law or after some drastic procedural simpliﬁcation, and then has slowed down to lower
levels (accompanied by a reduction of the number of marriages). This is for example the pattern
followed in all three countries that we mentioned in fn. 3 (Italy, UK, US), where divorce rates
went very high in the ’70s and have since stabilised at lower levels (see e.g. Smith 1997 for an
in-depth analysis of the UK case, and Rasul 2006 for a theoretical discussion that sheds light
on many empirical ﬁndings for the US and elsewhere). Recall that divorces occur early on in
marriage (Becker 1991), so that it takes relatively little time for the divorce rates to adjust in
response to changes in the environment.
A competing explanation would be that when divorce law is introduced or divorce is made
easier, there is a backlog of unsuccessful marriages that determines the initial jump upwards
of the divorce rate; once this ﬁrst wave has vanished, a trend settles in (this is for example
what Smith 1997 argues). This argument may be valid or not, but, mostly, it is diﬃcult to
reconcile it with the view of the agent as rational and capable of perfect foresight. First, it
would imply that many agents with poor prospects of a good marriage had actually married —
but in a rational world this should not have happened on a large scale. Second, it would imply
that the agents underestimated the cost of divorce, again something that should not happen in
a rational world; couples who have had to endure a diﬃcult marriage due to the impossibility
of divorce must have found a way of coping with the situation over the years, and it is doubtful
that the vast majority of them might want to embark in a divorce at this stage if they are aware
of the high costs of the process.
VC o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we have investigated the question why in the past 40 years or so, divorce has
become an increasing popular option in our Western civilization after centuries of stigmatisation.
We have argued that this is to be understood in the more general context of the changes brought
about by the replacement of informal social protection networks with the formal safety net
supplied by the Welfare State. Since the family has lost its previous place as the main provider
of social services, marriages have decreased in number, and divorce has become legally possible
as well as socially accepted. Furthermore, we noticed that the introduction of divorce has not
limited the decrease of the number of marriages, rather has acted as an additional reason for its
reduction. This is due to the extremely costly nature of the divorce process (both in monetary
and psychological terms): the expected beneﬁt from a marriage appears very small to many
23agents.
As concerns this latter point, we allowed for the possibility that the expected beneﬁti st a k e n
to be smaller than actually is. We compared a case in which agents were able to predict exactly
the probability of divorce with another in which, due to the use of an availability heuristic,
they overestimated the actual risk of divorce — thereby computing an exceedingly low expected
beneﬁt from marriage. We noticed that the predictions of the two versions of the model on how
the marriage rate as well as the divorce rate should move over time are somewhat diﬀerent, and
discuss their compatibility with the main stylised facts, concluding that the latter do not imply a
straightforward rejection of the availability heuristics hypothesis. The fact that the divorce rate
is higher in the ﬁrst periods of divorce law than in subsequent ones is indeed compatible with
this hypothesis. An initial tendency to overestimate the incidence of successful marriage favours
the presence of unstable marriages, that necessarily end up, in most cases, with a divorce. In
subsequent periods, this tendency vanishes, and is replaced by a tendency to overestimate the
risk of divorce; therefore all marriages are discouraged, including in particular the unstable ones,
and the rate of divorce goes down.
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